Demand elasticity estimates for New Zealand tourism

Demand elasticities for New Zealand tourism are estimated for 16 different international visitor segments. Segments are differentiated by origin, purpose of visit, and travel style. Elasticities for both international visitor arrivals and on-the-ground expenditure per arrival are estimated for each segment using time-series data. In general, on-the-ground consumption per arrival is more price sensitive than number of arrivals, and Asian market segments are found to be more price sensitive, both in terms of arrivals and on-the-ground expenditure, compared to international visitors from other regions. An application of the results is presented giving the total effect of exchange rate changes on expenditure by international visitors in New Zealand, and management implications are discussed.     

Cultural theory and risk perception: a proposal for a better measurement

Why do members of the public disagree – sharply and persistently – about facts on which expert scientists largely agree? We designed a study to test a distinctive explanation: the cultural cognition of scientific consensus. The ‘cultural cognition of risk’ refers to the tendency of individuals to form risk perceptions that are congenial to their values. The study presents both correlational and experimental evidence confirming that cultural cognition shapes individuals’ beliefs about the existence of scientific consensus, and the process by which they form such beliefs, relating to climate change, the disposal of nuclear wastes, and the effect of permitting concealed possession of handguns. The implications of this dynamic for science communication and public policy‐making are discussed.     

The impact of firm entry regulation on long-living entrants

What is the impact of firm entry regulation on sustained entry into self-employment? How does firm entry regulation influence the performance of long-living entrants? In this paper, I address these questions, exploiting a natural experiment in firm entry regulation. After German reunification, East and West Germany faced different economic conditions, but fell under the same law that imposes a substantial mandatory standard on entrepreneurs who want to start a legally independent firm in one of the regulated occupations. The empirical results suggest that the entry regulation suppresses long-living entrants, not only entrants in general or transient, short-lived entrants. This effect on the number of long-living entrants is not accompanied by a counteracting effect on the performance of long-living entrants, as measured by firm size several years after entry.     

The coordination roles of relief organisations in humanitarian logistics

The number of organisations involved in relief work in general and humanitarian logistics specifically is large and increasing, creating new complexity. In this paper we analyse different types of coordination and roles in two case studies of the humanitarian cluster system based on its initial development and the Kenyan Post-election crisis. The different and unclear roles of the organisations create significant problems before and after cluster activation and deactivation. Individual organisations take on many roles in the cluster system and beyond it in terms of coordination. The clarity of the roles affects the need for and ease of coordination. We suggest a simple basic categorisation of roles as a starting point for developing this concept in the field of humanitarian logistics and connect this to coordination.     

Monroe Friedman: Consumer Boycotts: Effecting Change Through the Marketplace and the Media

Journal of Consumer Policy -     

Institutional checks and balances and the political control of the money supply

The Nordhaus hypothesis about the political business cycle assertsthat elected politicians have incentives to expand the moneysupply prior to elections to stimulate the economy and therebyengineer their re-election. Central bank independence is widelyregarded as an institutional solution to this problem. However,this solution works only if central bankers are not perfectagents of their political principals, perhaps because they areconservative (more inflation-averse). This artide proposes analternative solution: political business cycles may be obstructedby institutional checks and balances. The analysis applies tothe Deutsche Bundesbank and has implications for the institutionalstructure of the future European Central Bank.     

Collective Action Cascades: An Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers

Self-interested individuals pursue their goals rationally taking into account the constraints imposed by their environment and best-responding to the strategic behavior of other individuals: when applied to collective action, economic theory predicts undersupply.
Meanwhile, the behavior of masses of people is described as excitable, emotional, irrational, suggestible, hypnotic, disorderly, and unpredictable: in practice, it seems, collective action is oversupplied, and erratically so. The contagious and volatile dynamics of collective action appear to defy rationalization.
I conceptualize a social movement as a dynamic informational cascade. Turbulencies emerge endogenously from rational individual behavior. Disorderly mass behavior is a by-product of a powerful decentralized mechanism of information aggregation.     

REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*

We consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth‐constrained agent are risk‐neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first‐period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be “too good” to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be “overqualified.”